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Abstract—The Software Defined Network (SDN) architecture
provides new opportunities to implement security mechanisms
in terms of unauthorized activities detection. At the same
time, there are certain risks associated with this technol-
ogy. The presented approach covers a conception of the mea-
surement method, virtual testbed and classification mecha-
nism for SDNs. The paper presents a measurement method
which allows collecting network traffic flow parameters, gener-
ated by a virtual SDN environment. The collected dataset can
be used in machine learning methods to detect unauthorized
activities.
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1. Introduction
The Software Defined Networks (SDNs) allow to imple-
ment and control network functionality through software.
Such an approach allows to deploy new services and ap-
plications in a virtual environment and to share resources
with the performance and isolation from the rest of pro-
cesses [1]. However, with the flexibility and scalability
provided by SDNs, it is important to maintain an ade-
quate security level. The intrusion detection technologies,
integrated with the SDNs environment, can provide an addi-
tional security element, besides the classical Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) and Intruder Prevention System (IPS).
SDN architecture creates new opportunities to increase the
security level, especially in the context of the unauthorized
activities detection. Nevertheless, there are certain risks
associated with this technology.
2. The Software Defined Network
Technology
The basic idea of the SDNs is the separation of data plane
from the control plane. In contrary to the classical network
solutions, the network devices are here supervised by SDN
controllers in a centralized manner. Such a solution enables
configuration and programming from a host to match the
service requirements in a distributed network. Moreover,
the centralized logic and management allows for compre-
hensive monitoring network [1].
SDNs are associated with Network Function Virtualization
(NFV). The current rapid development of hardware server
platforms gives sufficient performance of services operat-
ing on virtual machines. Servers became more efficient and
have better functionality than previously, and are suitable
for use in a virtual environment. NFV is a network archi-
tecture that implements virtualization of network nodes. It
enables for the functionality implementation based on the
available servers, switches, storage devices, without using
dedicated hardware devices. To sum up, the functionality
of network hardware devices can be implemented in soft-
ware technologies [2].
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Fig. 1. Packets forwarding scheme in SDNs.
The SDN controller communicates with network devices
using the OpenFlow protocol and controls network traffic
according to the programmed rules. The forwarding pack-
ets methods are defined in a flow table, which is stored in
SDN controllers and in switches memory supporting the
OpenFlow protocol. The operation order, which describes
how SDN controllers set the traffic flow, is presented in
Fig. 1. In the case, that packet is forwarded to the switch
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Fig. 2. Flow entry structure in SDNs.
and there is no entry in the flow table, the packet is trans-
mitted to the SDN controller. Applications and modules,
which run on controller, determine manner of packet pro-
cessing. After that, the controller transmits the new entry
in the flow table to the switch. That network traffic flow
is then defined and established using algorithms developed
on application modules in SDN controller. The structure
of the traffic flow is shown in Fig. 2.
The main flow element specifies the parameters that are
taken into consideration in the process of matching packets
to the flow. An action field defines a way of forwarding
that can be performed on packets from the particular flow.
In addition, flows are linked with specific network traffic
statistics, which latter can be used for traffic features ex-
traction [2].
Thanks to the open architecture, the network logic is estab-
lished with application modules running on the SDN con-
troller. Hence, it is possible to develop algorithms fulfilling
specific user functionality. Programmers can use classical
programming languages, frameworks, frameworks, APIs
and libraries for the process of developing application in
the SDN environment.
3. Vectors of Attacks in SDNs
The SDN architecture has an important impact on the class
of attack that can be performed, as presented in Fig. 3. The
most dangerous situation takes place when the SDN con-
troller is compromised. This can be done by the exploita-
tion of vulnerabilities of processes and services running
on the controller. Consequently the entire SDN domain is
compromised, and the attacker has the ability to take con-
trol of all network devices. The degree of vulnerability of
such attacks mainly depends on the hardware implemen-
tation of the SDN controller, programming languages and
libraries used. The threats prevention can utilize IDS and
IPS techniques, as well as methods of replication and re-
covery status of SDN servers from time before attack. Due
to the nature of SDN technologies, classical IDS may be
insufficient [3].
Potential security vulnerability may also exist on the admin-
istrative station, which is used to manage network operat-
ing system (SDN controller). Such terminals are used for
developing applications for the control logic of network de-
vices and ensure the monitoring of activities in the network
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Fig. 3. Potential vector of attacks in SDNs.
environment. Attackers could potentially exploit vulnera-
bility at the supervisor station or its connection with the
controller. Reducing the risk can be achieved by making
use of mutual SDN server authentication and the terminal
or IDS and/or IPS techniques [4].
Other threats are attacks on the communication stream be-
tween data and control plane. For instance, the security
protocol between controllers and network devices can be
TLS. A potential vector of attack would exploit vulnerabil-
ities in its implementation.
The classical network threats are still present in the SDN
technologies. It is possible to generate malicious activi-
ties in IT systems, for instance deny of services or exploit
vulnerabilities on servers, host or network devices [5].
4. Attacks Detection in SDNs
Despite the security vulnerabilities, SDN creates new op-
portunities for the implementation of more effective intru-
sion detection methods. Moreover, it allows for the inte-
gration of threat detection methods with the SDN environ-
ment. Due to the openness of platforms supporting SDN
technologies, it is possible to use existing mechanisms and
protocols. An important factor associated with intrusion de-
tection is the possibility of aggregating statistics logs from
network devices memory and forwarding them to the con-
troller. Collected parameters can be used as source data
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Table 1
Selected intrusion detection methods for SDNs
Approach
Principle of
Extraction of Machine learning
Detected attacks Accuracy
False
operation
attack symptoms method or logical
for dataset
Network traffic
[%]
positive
or features reasoning [%]
Method 1
Assessment of
Maximum entropy Benign – real SDN
the first packet
detector, TRW-CB, None DoS, probe network, attacks – 80–90 0–70
transmitted to the
Rate-limiting, NETAD artificial traffic
SDN controller
Method 2
Evaluation of the TRW-CB,
Fuzzy logic DoS
Artificial
95 1.2
threats level Rate-limiting traffic
Creating profiles
TRW-CB, DDoS, worm pro-
Benign – real SDN
Method 3 using sFlow
Entropy level
None
pagation probe
network, attack – 100 23–39.3
and OpenFlow artificial traffic
Flow statistics
Flow based Self-organized
DDoS Artificial
Method 4
collection
statistics maps of Artificial
from botnet traffic
98.57–99.11 0.46–0.62
and features Neural Network
for intrusion detection algorithms. In recent studies, there
are a few proposals to use SDN’s capabilities for intrusion
detection mechanism. The four sample solutions are shown
in Table 1:
• Method 1 – revisiting traffic anomaly detection using
software defined networking [6];
• Method 2 – a fuzzy logic-based information security
management for SDNs [7];
• Method 3 – combining OpenFlow and sFlow for an
effective and scalable anomaly detection and mitiga-
tion mechanism on SDN environments [8];
• Method 4 – lightweight DDoS flooding attack detec-
tion using NOX/OpenFlow [9].
The methods listed above detect common types of mali-
cious activities, i.e., denial of service, port scan, and at-
tempts to propagate malicious software. However, there
is no papers describing SDN solutions, which would en-
able the detection of more sophisticated groups of attacks.
These attacks can rely on the use of vulnerabilities in so-
phisticated services, and one of the phases of attack is to
inject a malicious code. The presented methods have a very
good detection accuracy rate, but the false positive rate is
poor in approaches given by method 3. In method 1 the
false positive rate may vary from 0 to 70 due to the detec-
tion technique used. Hence, it is problematic to compare
the effectiveness of selected solutions because their per-
formance tests were carried out in different environments,
according to various methodologies and using different
data sets.
5. The Architecture of the Proposed
Approach of Intrusion Detection
The presented idea is based on the assumption that it is
possible to classify whether network traffic flows represent
normal operation or attack (Fig. 4). The flows classifica-
tion is based on features obtained through the functionality
Virtual testbed
Traffic
generator
Measurement
module
Dataset
collection
Classification
mechanism
Evaluation
Sampling
Fig. 4. Architecture of presented mechanism.
available in the SDN technology. The virtual testbed is
used for generating certain classes of traffic, benign and
malicious. Generated network traffic is sampled by the
measurement module implemented as OSGi bundle and re-
sides on the Opendaylight SDN controller memory. The
module also programs flows. At the same time, the REST
client communicates with the SDN controller and collect
statistics related with flows. The present mechanism oper-
ates in the control plane. The collected data can be stored
in a database or an external file. At this stage, the fea-
tures for further classification can be calculated and ex-
tracted. The collected data are then converted to a dataset
for testing machine-learning methods. At the current stage
of research, the classification process is performed by self-
organized maps of Artificial Neural Network (SOM ANN),
but in future, studies would be extended to other classifi-
cation methods.
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6. Principle of Measurements
The measurement software module works on the SDN
Opendaylight controller as an OSGi bundle [10] and im-
plements the switch functionality (Fig. 5). The traffic flows
are matched by the following criteria:
• destination IP address,
• source IP address,
• destination port of transport layer,
• source port of TCP/UDP layer,
• protocols – ARP, IP, TCP, UDP or unknown.
For each flow, an idle timeout parameter is set that defines
the period after the entries are deleted from the flow ta-
ble, and an identification number. Such matching network
traffic distinguishes traffic in the context of different port
numbers. As a result, it is possible to measure the pa-
rameters and define relationships between connections at
the transport layer, which are refreshed within a specified
period.
Another component used in the measurements is a REST
client. This module communicates with the Opendaylight
server. The following parameters permit to change the res-
olution of measurements:
• time between queries (in the REST client),
• time between refresh of array status and statistical pa-
rameters defined configuration flow controller SDN.
For each collected flow, a set of parameters is determined.
These data values constitutes the input vector for the ma-
chine learning method:
• the measurement results contain value of n vectors
features Xi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) at i time of sampling. The
vector features xi are parameters and statistics re-
trieved from network flows;
• the input vector X(max x1, max x2, . . . , max xn) in-
cludes maximum values of features from all Xi vec-
tors;
• labels defining classes are assigned to vectors X , due
to IP host address.
In a review of the existing solutions in threat detection
technology, SDN indicates that the described method shall
detect the attack time from flow table. The presented ap-
proach is based on the flows classification by the trans-
port layer level discrimination. It allows identifying a spe-
cific connection representing the unauthorized action. The
Opendaylight software environment enables the measure-
ment of selected parameters, which can be potentially used
as features for threat detection methods.
The primary parameters obtained from the OpenFlow pro-
tocol are IP addresses, port numbers, duration, number of
packets and bytes in the flow. More, the collected statistics
REST
client
Flow statistics
Features calculated
from statistics
OPEN
DAYLIGHT
OSGi module
Programming flows:
- source and destination MAC
- source and destination IP
- IP and TCP/UDP layer protocols
- source and destination ports
- idle timeout > 0Flow sampling
http
JSON
Control plane
Data plane
Flow table entry
1st packet
from flow
Fig. 5. Measurement method based on SDNs.
can be used to extract other information. Such values are
calculated in the context of the entire array, for the sam-
ple time stamp. It reflects the dependence of connections
between hosts. Example additional features are:
• single flow coefficient,
• flow rate to the host,
• multiple flows with the same host coefficient,
• flow rate of the same service to a host from multiple
hosts.
The primary and additional parameters represent the x fea-
tures of the input vector X . Features can be determined
based on the first packet transmitted to the controller. How-
ever, at this stage of research, this mechanism is not imple-
mented. The approach of analyzing the header and the first
package contents may have a positive influence on the de-
tection performance of attacks on specific groups. However,
it is necessary to improve the performance without packets
inspection, because packets can be obfuscated. Therefore,
with the development of the presented method, it will be
evaluated which feature is more important.
7. Virtual SDN Testbed
The most of the machine learning methods for intrusion
detection is based on the KDD99Cup dataset. It is used in
the process of learning and testing, allowing comparing the
performance of different methods. Unfortunately, there are
no such datasets that could be used to evaluate the detection
methods. The proposed concept is based on the mechanism
of SDN flow classification. Therefore, an important com-
ponent of the presented approach is the test environment
for the generation of SDN network traffic, allowing veri-
fying the effectiveness of the presented method. In this
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Fig. 6. Virtual SDN testbed architecture.
Table 2
Traffic classes which are performed in virtual testbed
Activities
Examples Tools for traffic
of activities generation
DoS Denial of service
metasploit, hping3,
nping
Probe
Port probe, vulnerability
metasploit, nmap
scan, version scan
User2Root
Exploit vulnerabilities,
metasploit
shell control, backdoor
Remote2Local Password crack metasploit, hydra
Normal
Communication between
FTP, SSH, SMB,
clients and servers
Apache, Web,
Tomcat, RMI Ruby,
Java RMI, Postgres,
Telnet
research a SDN network emulator mininet, developed in
Python and C is used. In the connection with the Open-
daylight controller functionality, it is possible to model
the SDN environment with different network topologies. At
this stage of the implementation, the SDN has a star topol-
ogy with a single switch. The architecture of the testbed is
shown in the Fig. 6. The testbed covers normal traffic gen-
eration and selected groups of attacks using tools presented
in Table 2.
The following classes of activities are generated in this
virtual environment:
• normal – benign traffic generated between hosts and
servers;
• DoS – denial of service attacks, performed against
the transfer, network or computation resources of IT
system;
• Probe – port, version or vulnerability scanning. Such
activities give information to intruders about the po-
tential targets of the attacks;
• U2R – attacks work by exploitation of vulnerability;
• R2L – this class covers credentials guessing and
unauthorized access to IT resources.
The server side is emulated by metasploitable virtual ma-
chines with the Ubuntu Linux operating system. Vulner-
abilities of services and the OS are intentionally left on
the server environment. Simultaneously, the clients gener-
ate requests to the server. At the same time, the malicious
host performs unauthorized activities directed to servers by
using attack tools. The client activities are automated by
Python scripts [11]. Generated traffic is probing by the
measurement module. The servers reside on separate vir-
tual machines and clients are virtualized on the mininet OS
level.
8. Self-organizing Maps as Machine
Learning Attack Detector
Machine learning methods are commonly researched con-
cerning intrusion detection mechanisms [12]. The pre-
sented approach would use self-organized maps (SOM) to
perform the unauthorized activities detection. It is a method
of unsupervised machine learning, based on artificial neural
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networks, useful for a graphical representation of datasets.
However, when input vectors are labeled, this method can
be used as a classification mechanism. The Kohonen al-
gorithm is used as SOM learning method. As a result of
the applied input signals, network indicates the activation
of neurons in varying degrees, as a result of adaptation
to changes in the synaptic weights, during the process of
learning. Some neurons, or groups of neurons, are acti-
vated in response to stimulation, adapting to the form of
specific patterns. Because of this, the test vectors activate
neurons of a trained network, which are the most simi-
lar. After the initialization process, networks are reliant
based on the parameters, each of the neurons is assigned
to a specific position of the multidimensional space. Dis-
tribution of neurons can be created in a random way. They
are associated with neighbors in a hexagonal manner. In
a further stage, the network is learned by a training set.
The most stimulated neuron and neighboring neurons up-
date the weights, in response to learning vectors using the
scheme (see Fig. 7):
Wi(k +1) = Wi(k) = ηiG(r)
[
X −Wi(k)
]
, (1)
where: X – input vector of features, Wi – i weight vector
of the neuron at k time, ηi – learning rate, G(r) – neigh-
borhood function given by Eqs. (3) and (4).
The distances of input vector X(x1, x2, . . . , x j) to winner
neurons W (w1, w2, . . . , w j) are calculated on base of the
Euclidean distance:
d(X ,Wi) =
∥∥X −Wi
∥∥ =
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(x j−wi j)2 , (2)
where: X – input vector of features, x j – j feature in X input
vector, Wi – i weight vector of the neuron, wi j – j value of
weight in i weight vector of the neuron.
The weight adaptation degree G(i) of winner and neighbors
neurons is calculated by Gaussian formulas:
r = d(i,W ) =
∥∥i−W∥∥ =
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(i j−w j)2 , (3)
G(r) = e
−r2
2λ2 , (4)
where: r – Euclidean distance of i neuron from winner
neuron, W – winner neuron, λ – neighborhood radius.
The SOM network allows creating a type of structure,
which can be represent input vectors in the best way [13],
[14], [15]. It can be said, that the single neuron represents
many vectors from the dataset. The class is assigned to
the neuron with the consideration of which class is the
most numerous, from stimulating vectors. The classi-
fication step is preformed after learning. This involves
determining which labeled neuron is activated under the
input vector. The dataset is normalized in the range 0 . . .1.
The SOM input vector records are collected data in the
measuring module with assigned labels specifying the
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Fig. 7. Self-organizing map structure.
type of traffic. For instance, the 11 dimensional input
vector X(x1, x2, . . . , x11) elements can be represented by
following features:
x1 − destination IP address,
x2 − source IP address,
x3 − destination TCP/UDP port,
x4 − source TCP/UDP port,
x5 − duration,
x6 − number of packets in flow,
x7 − number of bytes in the flow,
x8 − single flow rate,
x9 − flow rate to the host,
x10 − multiple flows rate with the same source host,
x11 − rate of connections on the same port to a host from
other computers.
In addition, the feature vector is linked to a label that de-
fines the class of activities. Due to research scenario, the
composition of features in input vector can vary. To evalu-
ate performance, the cross validation method with 10 folds
will be used. After the process of learning, neural net-
work can be presented in low dimension space by using
Sammon mapping. The results of the classification will be
evaluated by the confusion matrix, ROC curves and typical
coefficients used in machine learning methods evaluation
process.
9. Summary
The presented research describes the intrusion detection
method integrated with the SDN controller. This concep-
tion classifies unauthorized activities performed in SDN
environment. Further studies cover the implementation of
all modules and performance tests of the detection mech-
anism. Realized implementation and evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness will be described in further publications. In
the case that the proposed mechanism will not be effec-
tive, it is necessary to research and implement additional
features, especially based on the parameters and data of
8
Intrusion Detection in Software Defined Networks with Self-organized Maps
the first packet in the flows. Another important stage is
the research on the most significant feature selection and
features extraction.
The aim of the work is also the investigation of the ability
to detect a wider range of network attacks, especially those
that are not identified in other technologies. It is important
to study new classes of attack specified for the SDN envi-
ronment. This aspect especially includes attacks on SDN
controllers and the control plane. The proposed method
may have potential performance disadvantages because of
the high-grained traffic matching in a flow table. The use
of the measuring module developed for all controllers in
the network can be problematic in terms of performance.
Therefore, an exemplary architecture can assume that only
selected SDN controllers in the network will implement
functions of intrusion detection. Another point is the com-
parison of other machine learning methods.
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